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Abstract 
 
Behavioural economics – the study of human decision making and how it sometimes 
deviates systematically from the assumptions of standard economic theory – has attracted 
a lot of attention in the health policy discourse over recent years. Many appear to believe 
that behavioural economic findings can be used only to help inform policies that 
manipulate the choices made by citizens; i.e. so-called nudge policy. However, these 
findings can be used to inform several different policy frameworks, from seemingly 
innocuous liberty-preserving changes to the contexts people operate in, to the outlawing 
of certain corporate behaviours. This article depicts diagrammatically, with the aid of a 
‘behavioural policy cube’ and in relation to smoking cessation interventions, the 
conceptual parameters of several behavioural economic-informed policy frameworks, 
which could be easily extended to other areas of health, and indeed broader public, 
policy. 
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Introduction 
 
Over recent years, partly due to the popularity and influence of Thaler and Sunstein’s 
book, Nudge, behavioural economics has gained a prominent place in the health – and 
broader – policy discourse [1].  This should be no surprise, because behavioural 
economics is really nothing more than the enquiry into how people make decisions, 
which is presumably of interest to policy makers across the ideological spectrum. More 
specifically, behavioural economics can be thought of as the set of observations that 
demonstrate that human decision making often conflicts systematically with the 
assumptions of standard economic theory.  
 
Behavioural economic findings that are perhaps among the most worthy of consideration 
among policy makers include present bias, loss aversion, probability weighting and 
reciprocity. Present bias is the observation that people place a heavy weight on the 
immediate moment, and quickly discount all future moments, which can make it difficult 
to predict what people will prefer in the future on the basis of their stated preferences 
now. For example, Read and van Leeuwen present evidence that people will often choose 
healthy over tastier unhealthy snacks if they are asked to pre-commit to their choices for 
consumption at some future date, but many will prefer to switch to the unhealthy snacks 
at the point of consumption [2]. Loss aversion is the finding that people often care about 
losing something far more than they do about gaining that same thing, and probability 
weighting is the tendency for people to overweight small probabilities and underweight 
large probabilities.  
 
That human beings are at least sometimes motivated by reciprocity rather than entirely 
self-regarding utility maximisation has been repeatedly demonstrated in ultimatum 
games, in which ‘donors’ are given a money amount and are asked to allocate a share of 
the amount that they are given to an anonymous recipient. If the recipient accepts the 
share, then both donor and recipient go home with those respective allocations, but if the 
recipient declines then both parties go home with nothing. According to standard 
economic theory, the donor should offer a very small share because he ought to want to 
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retain as much of the money as possible and, for the recipient, anything ought to be better 
than nothing. It is not untypical for donor offers to exceed 40% (see, for example, [3]), 
partly because donors know that they will be punished by recipients if they make an offer 
that may be considered insulting, a finding that is linked to transaction utility – i.e. the joy 
that people feel when they receive a good deal and the pain that they experience when 
they are exploited [4].   
 
 
Behavioural policy frameworks 
 
The above are just some, albeit some of the most important, of the behavioural economic 
phenomena. As an input into policy deliberations they can be used in a variety of ways. 
To date, the most influential behavioural economic policy framework has been that 
advocated by Thaler and Sunstein, formally called libertarian paternalism and 
colloquially known as nudge policy [1]. Nudges require a redesign of people’s 
environments according to the findings of behavioural economics such that their 
instantaneous choices are more likely to align with their deliberative preferences. Thus, 
the focus is on reducing negative internalities – the longer term harms that people impose 
on themselves through their own ill-considered automatic decisions, which may be driven 
by factors such as present bias (i.e. smokers may focus on the immediate pleasurable 
sensation offered by cigarettes, and overlook the long-term negative consequences). In a 
nudge, there should be no burden on those who choose their pre-existing behaviours 
rationally and thus wish to continue with those behaviours, and therefore the approach 
does not allow regulation or bans, and it also rules out using significant financial 
incentives and overt persuasion to change behaviour.  
 
Three core features of libertarian paternalism are presented in Figure 1. Movement 
towards a on the ab axis indicates that a policy is increasingly liberty-preserving and 
antiregulatory, movement towards a on the ae axis indicates that a policy is increasingly 
informed by behavioural economics rather than standard economic theory, and movement 
towards a on the ad axis indicates that a policy is increasingly addressing internalities 
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rather than externalities (i.e. actions that cause harms imposed on others). Consequently, 
policies that lie on the adhe cube face are entirely liberty preserving, those on the abcd 
face are heavily informed by behavioural economics, and those on the baef face entirely 
address internalities. A classic nudge, satisfying all three requirements fully, must lie at 
the point at which the aforementioned axes intersect, at point a in Figure 1. A health-
related example of such an intervention is the requirement that supermarkets hold their 
cigarettes behind the checkout counter rather than display them on aisle shelving; the 
customer remains free to buy cigarettes, but one could argue that their positioning behind 
the checkout makes them less likely to invade the customer’s immediate and automatic 
decision making mental apparatus (i.e. present bias), which may be good for many of 
those who might otherwise buy the cigarettes, as judged deliberatively by those persons 
themselves.   
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Externalities Internalities 
Regulatory 
Liberty 
Behavioural 
Rational 
Nudges 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
Budges 
Shoves 
 6 
Figure 1: The Behavioural Public Policy Cube 
 
Libertarian paternalism is known as a soft form of paternalism because it claims to 
respect autonomy. Conly outlines a harder form of paternalism that is also informed by 
the findings of behavioural economics in that she concurs that people engage in many 
self-harmful behaviours due to bounds on their rationality in their automatic choices, but 
by retaining autonomy she dismisses nudge policy for being insufficiently effective [5]. 
Conly calls for coercive paternalistic measures in the form of the explicit regulation of 
individual behaviours in cases where the broadly considered benefits of the regulation to 
the individuals themselves are perceived to outweigh the broadly perceived costs. 
Following this logic, she calls for a ban on smoking, because she contends that one of the 
fundamental goals for all human life is the maintenance of health. Coercive paternalistic 
measures are sometimes referred to as shoves.  
 
The basic tenets of coercive paternalism can also be represented in Figure 1. As with 
nudges, shoves are informed by behavioural economics in that they aim to counter errors, 
caused by, for instance, present bias, in individual behaviours, and is also focused on 
addressing internalities: i.e. on protecting people from themselves. Unlike libertarian 
paternalism it calls for strong regulatory measures, and thus a classic shove, such as a ban 
on smoking in Conly’s justification, would be placed at the intersection of the 
aforementioned axes at point b in Figure 1.  
 
For many, shoves entail too much interference in personal lifestyle choices; yet nudges 
have been further criticised for being manipulative and for potentially crowding out more 
effective regulatory measures [6]. Rather than (or perhaps in addition to) turning to 
regulating the behaviours of citizens, however, one can use behavioural economics to 
help inform the appropriate regulation of private corporations. Behavioural economic-
informed regulatory interventions of the supply side are known as budges [7].  
 
Budge policy focusses on countering the profit maximising behavioural economic 
informed harmful manipulation of consumers by private organisations by openly 
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regulating against these activities. For example, it is likely that the type of packaging that 
cigarette manufacturers have traditionally used for their products was chosen so as to 
attract customers; implicitly, they have used one of the findings of behavioural economics 
– i.e. present bias – in order to capture the immediate attention of potential clientele. If 
policy makers and public opinion concurred that this practice is harmful in encouraging 
people to smoke who might otherwise have not done so, then mandatory plain packaging 
of cigarettes may rightly be classified as a budge. That is, it would be a regulation to 
counter implicit behavioural economic-informed measures used by private interests that 
impose externalities, otherwise known as harms, upon others.  
 
The fundamental requirements of budge policy can also be depicted in Figure 1. As with 
nudges and shoves, budges are informed by the findings of behavioural economics. 
Budges use this knowledge to counter with regulation the inappropriate, if implicit, use of 
these findings by private interests as a means by which to maximise profits in harmful 
ways. Thus, budges would cluster around the intersection of the axes at point c in Figure 
1. Also in common with nudges and shoves, budges will of course attract critics; in 
particular, business interests, often with powerful lobby arms, will be motivated to 
emphasise the possible negative economic growth and innovation implications of 
additional regulation, illustrated in the UK context by the tobacco companies, who had 
some success in stalling regulation for plain packaging on cigarette cartons.   
 
    
Conclusion 
 
Behavioural economics is the study of human behaviour, and its findings can be used to 
inform usefully many different policy frameworks, all of which will nonetheless attract 
critics. For instance, nudge policy can be accused of being covert, manipulative and 
insufficiently effective, shove policy of being overly intrusive in personal lifestyle 
choices, and budge policy of damaging legitimate business interests.    
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Pure types of each policy framework have been diagrammatically depicted in Figure 1. 
Most actual policies will not fall at a, b or c, but will rather be placed inside the cube. For 
example, even if we take only the internalities to externalities axis, the justification for 
behaviourally-informed smoking cessation policies is likely to be in part motivated by a 
concern for the smokers themselves, but also for others that may fall victim to second-
hand smoking. Thus, with respect to smoking cessation, few policies are ever likely to be 
a pure nudge (or a pure shove), strictly defined, irrespective of what government rhetoric 
might suggest.  
 
This is important, because nudge policy has formed the focus of attention in the 
behavioural economic-informed policy dialogue in several country contexts over recent 
years, to the extent that many, in academic and policy circles, now seem to equate 
erroneously behavioural economic policy with nudging. If scrutinised, it will be 
discovered that many policies that are being advocated as nudges, in smoking cessation 
policy, broader health policy, and even broader public policy, are actually budges, and 
perhaps even shoves. Populating the behavioural policy cube with these policies will be 
informative, and will help to ascertain the extent to which government pronouncements 
and action in this increasingly important policy area are aligned.      
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Figure 1: The Behavioural Policy Cube 
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